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Chris J's avatar

I was a judge for 15 years of a 40 year legal career retired now. Judge Ho has been a judge for a cup of coffee as we used to say. He has civil practice and then a very short time being a judge. His comments about the safety of his colleagues is in a word ignorant. In another word, it’s disgusting. What a disappointment to see such a rank hack on the bench.

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Kevin Morgan's avatar

Ho doesn't seem to be doing himself any favors by his relationships with his fellow 5th Circuit judges. In one recent vote whether to rehear a case en banc, he was the only vote in favor of rehearing, and instead of taking the hint, he wrote a long dissent from the decision pointing out how every one of his 16 colleagues, apparently, was wrong.

In a second similar case, he did manage to get Chief Judge Elrod to vote with him to rehear (vs the 15 who did not), but she wouldn't even sign on to his dissenting opinion. And in a huge rebuke, most of the rest of the conservatives on the court, including every other Trump appointee, signed an opinion detailing why Ho was wrong. One might guess that they don't like him at all.

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Jack Jordan's avatar

To Judge Ho, we should say, "Good riddance." His public conduct and public comments over the past (at least) 10 months have been shameful and a national embarrassment. He deliberately violated his oaths of office and our Constitution, specifically to knowingly and willfully violate the freedom of expression and freedom of association of students and faculty at Columbia (at least). The FJA should have expelled Judge Ho long ago.

Judge Ho helped lead an undisciplined gang of federal judges to publicly pretend that something in our Constitution gave them the power to punish (regulate) political and religious "viewpoints" at "Columbia University." See https://freebeacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/letter.pdf. Their express objective was to regulate political and religious "Viewpoint(s)" on "the faculty and across the administration—including the admissions office."

The judges directly violated our freedom of expression by discriminating based on viewpoint of expression (specifically, religious and political viewpoints). Then, they violated our freedom of association by declaring their extrajudicial punishment of students who merely associate with Columbia students or faculty: "we will not hire anyone who joins the Columbia University community—whether as undergraduates or law students— beginning with the entering class of 2024."

The federal judges' blatantly unconstitutional extrajudicial punishment went even further: "Columbia" is "disqualified" (by a gang of federal judges in a mere letter) "from educating the future leaders of our country." Nothing in our Constitution authorized judges to impose any punishment on any "person" (and the Fifth Amendment emphatically precluded depriving any person of any liberty) except with all "due process of law."

Judge Ho knew (and knows) that nothing in our Constitution delegated to any federal court (much less individual judges) any power to impose extrajudicial punishment to support retaliation and discrimination based on any political or religious viewpoint.

In 2022 in Shurtleff v. City of Boston, SCOTUS famously re-emphasized the unconstitutionality of viewpoint discrimination, specifically when based on religious viewpoint:

No federal public servant was delegated any power to "exclude" or regulate (much less punish) any "speech" on the basis of "religious viewpoint." Such conduct constitutes "impermissible viewpoint discrimination." Any public servant who "discriminated based on religious viewpoint" necessarily "violated the Free Speech Clause" (at least).

In Shurtleff, SCOTUS invoked controlling precedent pertaining to schools from 2001 (Good News Club v. Milford Central School) and 1995 (Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia). In Rosenberger, SCOTUS emphasized that a public official targeting "particular views" commits "blatant" and "egregious" "violation of the First Amendment." Any "viewpoint discrimination" by any public servant is "presumed impermissible" (it presumably violates our Constitution) "when directed against speech" that has not been proved (with clear and convincing evidence) to exceed a "forum's limitations."

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Jack Jordan's avatar

I'm profoundly unimpressed with the integrity or judgment of a bunch of judges (the FJA) who chose to insert the following blatantly unconstitutional objection in their letter: "We appreciate and commend those, including Chief Justice Roberts, who have commented recently on the rise in criticism [ ] aimed at members of the judiciary."

Such so-called public servants would do well to remember that copious controlling SCOTUS precedent specifically protects attorneys and their speech criticizing judges. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for SCOTUS in Snyder v. Phelps, re-emphasized that “speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.” Coincidentally, SCOTUS in Snyder was quoting Connick v. Myers from 1983, which protected the freedom of speech of attorneys, even those who are actually employed by the government. In Snyder, SCOTUS also elaborated on when “[s]peech deals with matters of public concern.”

In Snyder, SCOTUS reiterated a principle from a 1964 unanimous SCOTUS decision (Garrison v. Louisiana), also protecting the freedom of speech of attorneys, even those who are actually employed by the government (Garrison, a government attorney, publicly criticized 8 judges, including by questioning their integrity). Americans' “speech concerning public affairs” is “the essence of self-government,” and it “should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” and it may “include vehement, caustic,” and “unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”

Garrison publicly implied that one or more judges were criminally corrupt. Even so, a unanimous SCOTUS in Garrison emphasized that the “public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants” is “paramount,” so “anything which” even “might touch on an official’s fitness for office is relevant” and protected, including judges’ “dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation.”

Mere months before Garrison, a unanimous SCOTUS (quoting James Madison) in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, emphasized that our “Constitution created a [republican] form of government under which ‘The people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty.’ [Our Constitution] dispersed power” in many ways precisely because “of the people’s” extreme “distrust” of people with “power” at “all levels.” In our “Republican Government,” the “censorial power is” necessarily generally “in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people.”

All “public men” are essentially “public property,” so our “discussion" of any official's official conduct "cannot be denied and the right” and “duty” of “criticism must not be stifled.” "Those who won our independence believed" that "public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government." "It is as much" the "duty" of "the citizen-critic of government" to "criticize as it is the official’s duty to administer."

So all courts must protect all Americans’ “privilege for criticism of official conduct.” All courts must “support” the “privilege for the citizen-critic of government.” Such “privilege is required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” In fact, "freedom of expression upon public questions is secured [as a] constitutional safeguard to assure unfettered interchange of ideas [to bring about] political and social changes desired by the people. [ F]ree political discussion [so] that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means[ is] essential to the security of the Republic [and] is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system."

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